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1) Introduction: ignoramus and ignorabimus?1 
 
In the last couple of centuries, the history of physics has at times been sparkled by two opposite 
attitudes, which to simplify we could denote a radically pessimistic and an overoptimistic one. As a 
famous representative of the former first camp, we find the German physiologist Emile Du Bois-
Reymond, who in a famous speech held in 1880 at the Berlin Academy of science claimed that there 
were seven world enigmas (Die Sieben Welträtzel) that neither science nor philosophy could ever solve. 
Among these mysteries, he listed the nature of matter and force, the origin of life, the origin of intelligent 
thought and the question of free will.  
As a representative of the overoptimistic camp, we can enlist Lord Kelvin when, a couple of 
decades later (April 27, 1900) gave a speech at the Royal Institute entitled "Nineteenth-Century Clouds 
over the Dynamical Theory of Heat and Light”, in which he defended the view that physical knowledge 
was complete, so that the only future task for physicists was the “minor” one of providing more precise 
experimental measures of already known quantities. However, more realistically, deeply cognizant as he 
was of contemporary physical theories, mentioned “two clouds” - that as we now know, will lead to a 
thunderstorm! - namely the failure of Michelson and Morley’s experiment and the ultraviolet catastrophe 
(clouds that have been swept away thanks to the special theory of relativity and to quantum mechanics 
respectively). By stressing the impassable limits of science, Du Bois-Reymond’s Latin motto stirred a 
strong, optimistic reaction also on the part of the mathematical community. For example, in his 1930 
speech at the  Society of German Scientists, the great German mathematician David Hilbert expressed 
the view that: “In opposition to the foolish ignorabimus, our slogan shall be: Wir müssen wissen – wir 
werden wissen”.2  
                                                 
1 We don’t know, we will never know
2 “We must know, we will know” is the motto written on Hilbert’s tomb. 
Advices like that received at the end of the 19th century by the German physicist Max Planck are 
difficult to classify: older physicists discouraged him from studying physics, because according to these 
them there was nothing left to be discovered!  Even though this counsel might have been motivated by 
the pessimistic outlook that physics was complete simply because it had reached the limits of the human 
knowledge, it should be clear why the optimistic motivation was also present, given the presumption of 
completeness reached by the contemporary physics. Relatedly, in 1981, in another famous essay that was 
certainly inspired by an overoptimistic attitude, the English physicist Steven Hawking claimed that the 
End of Physics might be in sight (1981), so that the major problems of physics would have been solved 
by the end of last century: “By this I mean that we might have a complete, consistent and unified theory 
of the physical interactions which would describe all possible observations” (Hawking 1981, p.15). 
 
2   Quantum limits of knowledge: from sociology, to mathematics, to physics 
 
Going now to our topic, we should keep in mind that there have various attempts to exploit quantum 
mechanics to claim that the theory has set an impassable limit to our capacity to know the natural world. 
The first explanations are mainly sociological or historical, and certainly more superficial than those 
arguments coming from mathematics and physics that will be presented subsequently. 
 
2.1 Historical and sociological hypothesis 
 
Some historians of quantum mechanics - like Forman (1984) - have very controversially claimed 
that a merely “instrumentalist” interpretation of the formulas of the emergent quantum mechanics 
(Bohr's Copenhagen interpretation in particular)3 was influenced by the postwar revolt that characterized 
the Weimar republic and that contrasted in general rationalistic and realistic philosophies of science. 
According to Forman, in that cultural milieu the scientific fact that positions and momentum cannot be 
simultaneously known was regarded as evidence for a failure of causality, and therefore for the 
impossibility of a precise and exact knowledge of the physical world. To the extent that Bohr’s 
hegemonic interpretation of quantum mechanics (that will be discussed below) is regarded as stressing 
too much the unknowability of certain aspect of nature, attempts to explain his and textbook views of 
quantum mechanics as due to mere historical contingencies have generated an interesting literature that 
                                                 
3 We should keep in mind that the so-called Copenhagen interpretation has been regarded as an historical myth (2004).  
here we will not review. The question posed in this historical and sociological context is: why 
formulations of the theory (for instance Bohm’s) that are regarded as clearer and less mysterious (as well 
as empirically equivalent) were neglected until the 50ies even if they were available since the mid-
twenties with De Broglie? (Cushing 1994).4 
Rather than discussing possible explananda of the hypothesis that quantum mechanics sets limit to 
our knowledge sociological theories that are external to physics proper, in what follows I will concentrate 
on the internal logical and conceptual aspects of quantum mechanics itself. In particular, in the next 
section I will sketch very important mathematical results (no-go theorems”) that depend purely on the 
formal structure of the Hilbert space and I will then show the consequences that they have on the 
conceptual and experimental practice. In both cases, we will see how the ways in which such theorems 
are typically used to argue in favor of the existence of impassable limits of our knowledge of the physical 
world depend to an important extent on implicit philosophical stances about the crucial question: what is 
quantum theory about? (Laudisa 2014)  
Rather than limiting in principle our knowledge of the external world, the structure of the Hilbert 
space poses some constraints on the ontology and metaphysics of quantum theory that certainly differ 
from those of classical physics and that are independently supported by the experimental practice and by 
a sound philosophical analysis. In a nutshell, my thesis is that both senses in which quantum mechanics 
can be legitimately regarded as a theory that sets important limits to our knowledge of the natural world 
(the formal and the experimental/philosophical one) that however don’t justify Du-Boys Reymond’s 
radically skeptical attitude to quantum mechanics  
 
2.2 The mathematical no-go theorems 
 
As in the case of the impossibility theorems demonstrated by Gödel, the mathematical structure of 
the Hilbert space by itself can be used to rule out in a rigorous way certain natural, commonsensical as 
well as classical assumptions about the physical world, specifically the non-contextuality of possessed 
properties (Kochen and Specker 1967).5 After briefly revising two of the most significant no-go 
theorems, in the next section I will show in what sense the philosophical contents of the formal results 
                                                 
4 What must be excluded is that quantum theory can be used to motivate certain irrationalistic attitudes that emerge 
from other corners of our culture: a superficial identification of indeterminism with irrationality neglects completely the fact 
that the main evolution equation in non-relativistic quantum mechanics, namely Schrödinger’s, is deterministic and that 
Born’s rule yields very precise even if merely probabilistic predictions  that cannot be used to justify the existence of principled 
limits to our knowledge. 
5 Ghirardi’s 1985, Isham’s 1995, Hughes’1989 and Held’s 2000 are good, accessible treatment of the problem. 
were “anticipated” by Bohr’s philosophical and conceptual analysis, which insisted on the very general 
fact that - except after having performed a measurement in which the state of the system is an eigenstate 
of the observable -  quantum measurements do not reveal preexisting values, but only values that we 
obtain after measurement. Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations are a particular case of this very general, 
characterizing feature of the theory and this simple truth is recognized also by defenders of Bohmian 
mechanics (Allori and Zanghì 2005), who press for the definiteness or non-contextuality of the positions 
of all the particles that compose all physical systems.  
The first important no-go results in the history of quantum mechanics is von Neumann’s argument 
against the possibility of a hidden variables theory that be empirically equivalent to standard quantum 
theory (von Neumann 1955). These variables would assign a definite value to all the magnitudes 
describing a system. Already in this first example we will see the role of the philosophical intuitions in 
guiding the efforts of scientists and mathematicians.  
By following the notation by Ghirardi (1985) let us indicate a hidden variable with the symbol H 
and three observables with the symbol A, B and C. Within a hidden variable theory, if we assume that A 
is a function of H, “the value A(H) is definite and must coincide with one of the values predicted by the 
standard theory” (Ghirardi 1985, p.178 of the Italian edition). Now suppose that the observable A is a 
linear combination of the other two observables B and C. If A is self-adjoint, then also any linear 
combination of A of B and C with numbers b and c must self-adjoint: 
(i) A=bB+cC 
Von Neumann assumed that also the definite values assumed by the other two functions of the 
hidden variable, namely bB(H)+cC(H), must exemplify the same relation: 
(ii) A(H)=bB(H)+cC(H) 
It can be shown, however, that (ii) is false because it does not hold generally (Bell 1966, p. 4) since 
it holds only for classical observables and for commuting observables. If the observables in questions are 
not simultaneously measurable or mutually compatible, then the determined values of two non-
commuting observables do not satisfy (ii), but only their averages do. In a word, if the choice of A, B, C, 
is such that any two of them are incompatible, i.e. are not jointly observable, then von Neumann’s result 
is unsuccessful, because in order to measure two incompatible observables one needs two different and 
incompatible measurement context or apparata. 
Kochen and Specker’s theorem (1967) presupposes a Hilbert space with dimension ≥3 but 
reinforces the case against the existence of hidden variables by assuming that the above mentioned three 
observables are pairwise compatible: A is compatible with B and with C, but B is not compatible with C 
and likewise for the other combinations. The theorem succeeds in showing that the actual formalism of 
quantum theory allows us to prove formally that a quantum system cannot be assigned “too many 
definite, intrinsically possessed magnitudes” (Isham 1995, p.199).  
As is common to do in the literature, let us call the principle according to which any quantum 
system has definite properties at all times value definiteness. Kochen and Specker’s theorem states that  
(i) if the state spaces has dimensions > 2 and  
(ii) if B and C are incompatible observables,  
then  
if, one measures the observable A together with B one gets a different result than what one gets 
when A is measured together with C, observables. The result is of exceptional importance and has been 
demonstrated by using different techniques (see Held 2000). Its philosophical significance can be more 
simply be stated by claiming that it is the measurement context that defines the properties of physical 
system, so that the former and the latter constitute an unbreakable whole, something that, as we will see 
in the remainders of the paper, Bohr had very often insisted upon well before 1967. 
 
2.3    The philosophical meaning of the no-go theorems and the quantum limits of knowledge 
 
There are various revolutionary philosophical conclusions stemming from this theorem. If a realist 
about possessed properties wants to escape the strictures of the theorem by holding to the principle of 
value definiteness as much as possible, she must claim that some of them are definite and always 
possessed, while others are not. As is well known, in Bohmian mechanics, for instance, positions are 
always and everywhere possessed and definite, since they are the only non-contextual properties. All the 
other properties (like spin), on the contrary, also in Bohmian mechanics are contextual (see Clifton and 
Pagonis 1995). The significance of this theorem, therefore, is relevant also to those interpretations of 
quantum mechanics that reject pragmatist or instrumentalist views of the theory. 
More in general, if the theorem “forces” us to change our conception of reality, in the sense that a 
physical system possesses some of its properties A (the state dependent ones) only in a relational or 
contextual sense, we cannot help but noticing that Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics were 
already explicitly in favor of the idea that finding out about the properties of an observable system calls 
for a specific measurement setting, which in its turn calls for an explicit kind of holism. As Bohr clearly 
stated in the 1949 volume in honor of Einstein, we must accept the “impossibility of any sharp separation 
between the behavior of atomic objects and the interaction with the measuring instruments which serve 
to define the conditions under which the phenomena appear” (Bohr 1949, 210, emphasis in the original).  
At this point we should add an important caveat. We should not ask from realist understandings of 
quantum mechanics conditions that the theory cannot satisfy. The question of the “knowability of the 
physical world” must always be asked within a particular physical theory and not in general.  If 
intrinsically or contextually possessed properties of a physical system were a necessary condition for 
some form of realism about these properties, then we would have to conclude that quantum mechanics 
must be interpreted as an instrumentalist recipe for predictions. After all, in the macroworld, we don’t 
believe that the properties of my table (like its shape or hardness) need a specification of “the conditions 
under which the phenomena appear” 
Consequently, the question of the “quantum limits of knowledge” must be examined by 
presupposing the mathematical constraints of the theory, that reflect on a formal level those practical and 
experimental settings that are needed to come to know the properties of physical systems.  In particular, 
we will discuss some aspects of this new relationist and contextualist conception of reality by comparing, 
in their apparent diversity, Bohr’s holistic and Rovelli’s relationist interpretation of the formalism, that 
deep down share a unifying metaphysics of dispositions and propensities. In a different sense also an 
aspect of Everettian quantum mechanics (1956,1957) can be interpreted as advocating a perspectival 
view of reality, in the sense that a perspective-free view of reality is impossible.  
 
3 Bohr’s ontological dispositionalism: the quantum unknowability of intrinsic properties 
 
In order to set the framework of our discussion, we should avail ourselves of the distinction among 
intrinsic and extrinsic properties that has been defended by the great American philosopher David Lewis 
(1983). Even if this distinction is rather controversial and has been widely discussed in the metaphysical 
literature (see Marshall and Weatherson 2018 for a review) it will be prove illuminating for making sense 
of some of the aspects of the philosophy of quantum mechanics that are very relevant to our purpose.  
Intuitively, a property is intrinsic if any object exemplifies it or can exemplify it independently of 
anything else in the Universe. A typical example of an intrinsic property is “having a mass”. An extrinsic 
property like “having a weight” is instead attributable to a body only in relation with something else and 
in fact our weight on the Moon is different from our weight on Earth, while our mass is identical in the 
two environments. We could also characterize the distinction by using a modal language: “If something 
has an intrinsic property, then so does any perfect duplicate of that thing; whereas duplicates situated in 
different surroundings will differ in their extrinsic properties. (Lewis 1983: 197). A duplicate of an object 
having the same mass will different in its extrinsic properties (weight) if located in different 
environments. In Bohr’s language, this translates into the claim that if the same quantum system S (two 
duplicates) is situated into two different measurements settings (“surroundings”), it will display different 
extrinsic properties and in this sense these properties are not intrinsically possessed, but purely extrinsic.  
However, note that there is an important difference between an extrinsic (or relational) property 
and a contextual one.6 “Being a brother of” is relational because it cannot be exemplified independently 
of a sister or a brother (same for having a certain weight that cannot be instantiated without a massive 
object) but each sibling has intrinsic properties like mass, volume, shape, genetic code etc. that do not 
depend on what else is around. If parents, ancestors and siblings were to disappear, all of the properties 
of one of the two siblings would become non-relational in the sense that relational properties of this kind 
seem to be reducible to the intrinsic properties of the relata.  
A contextual property P, instead, has features that “depend much more” on the surroundings, in the 
sense that P is literally unknowable without an interaction with the environment that in principle alters 
it. An extrinsically possessed set of properties (having a certain weight) can be measured only given a 
certain setting, but is predefinite before a measurement. This situation is rather unlike contextualism as 
formally established by Kochen and Specker’s theorem, and which, as mentioned above, is implicit in 
the experimental practice and in conceptual analysis and consequently explicitly present in Bohr’s 
philosophy. Bohr was the first to realize that the contextual properties P of a system S are literally 
unknowable without a measurement interaction that however alters them, a revolutionary conclusion of 
quantum theory that must be accepted independently of its different interpretations and formulations.  
One can insist on the fact that the consequence of the contextuality principle are not so dramatic: 
as the bohemian physicist Goldstein often remarks, it is quite trivial to recognize that the outcome of an 
experiment depends on the experiment context that is used to perform it: “experiments differ and different 
experiments usually have different results. The misleading reference to measurement, which suggests 
that a pre-existing value of A is being revealed, makes contextualism seem more than it is” (Goldstein 
2017, my emphasis).  
However, both Heisenberg indeterminacy relations and Bohr’ holistic philosophy of quantum 
mechanics can be stated in a more general way without any reference to the changing measurement 
settings, since they are a consequence of the inescapable fact that also Goldstein seems to downplay at 
                                                 
6 There are subtleties about the difference between relational and extrinsic properties that need detail us (see Marshall 
and Weatherson 2018) 
least in this passage, namely that “there are no measurement apparatuses that allow the determination 
of the quantum state of an object” (Allori and Zanghì 2006, p.254, my translation, my emphasis). By 
paraphrasing the words of these two Italian scholars, and drawing their consequence for the purpose of 
this paper, this is the true impassable epistemic limit imposed by the theory, which in its turn depends on 
the smallness of quantum systems and of the quantum of action.  
In a word, there is a sense in which the intrinsic magnitudes of any quantum system S are 
unknowable, exactly because measurements don’t reveal preexisting properties, something that has been 
appropriately endorsed also by Bohr’s archenemy, namely John Bell: “the word [measurement] very 
strongly suggest the ascertaining of some pre-existing property…Quantum experiments are not just like 
that, as we learnt especially from Bohr. The results have to be regarded as the joint product of “system” 
and “apparatus” (quoted in Whitaker 1989, 180, my emphasis).  
Evidence for his full endorsement of the holistic nature of any measurement interaction is provided 
by Bohr himself: “While, within the scope of classical physics, the interaction between object and 
apparatus can be neglected or, if necessary, compensated for, in quantum physics this interaction forms 
an inseparable part of the phenomenon.” (Bohr 1963, 4, my emphasis). On the basis of this and other 
passages (see Howard 1994), Bohr is here referring with other words to the typically quantum mechanical 
phenomenon of non-separability. This implies that two possible readings of the expressions “joint 
product” and “inseparable part of the phenomena” - and therefore of the nature of the ensuing epistemic 
limit dictated by quantum mechanics - must be excluded. 
The first reading to be ruled has it that this “joint product” can be interpreted as a mere 
neopositivistic appeal to the fact that it is meaningless to talk about state-dependent properties of quantum 
entities independently of a measurement apparatus.7 The fact that one cannot know the properties of a 
system without creating an inseparable whole with the measuring apparatus (an epistemic constraint) is 
not equivalent to claiming that it is meaningless to refer to a ontically indeterminate, because not-yet 
measured and therefore not-existent properties of quantum systems (see above). An extra reason to reject 
this first reading of Bohr’s expression is that the neopositivist conception of the meaning of a sentence 
has been substantially abandoned. One must distinguish ontological claims from epistemic claims: before 
Wiles’ solution of Fermat last theorem, the proof lacked, but now we discovered that it is true, which 
seems to imply that it was nonetheless true before the actual demonstration, that is, before we came to 
                                                 
7 For this reading see Redhead 1987, 49-51, and Beller and Fine 1994. 
know that it is true. One would not want to claim that before the actual proof its statement was 
meaningless! 
The second reading to be rejected involves the disturbance view of measurements interactions, that 
Bohr plausibly abandoned already as a consequence of his reply to EPR (Bohr (1935)8. In this reply in 
fact, Bohr wrote quite clearly that “there is in a case like that just considered no question of a mechanical 
disturbance of the system under investigation during the last critical stage of the measuring procedure 
(Bohr, 1935 p. 700, my emphasis) 9 The italicized expression means that Bohr rejected non-local effects, 
exactly like Einstein What is the meaning, therefore, of Bohr’s holism”? In order to answer this question, 
which is crucial for the purpose of this paper, we must quote Bohr in full and try to clarify his somewhat 
obscure prose.  the view that the measurement outcomes are “the joint product of systems and 
apparatuses” …implies that any form of knowledge of the single quantum system is impossible, since it 
depends on the influence “of the very conditions which define the possible types of predictions regarding 
the future behavior of the system. Since these conditions constitute an inherent element of the description 
of any phenomenon to which the term "physical reality" can be properly attached, we see that the 
argumentation of the mentioned authors does not justify their conclusion that quantum-mechanical 
description is essentially incomplete” (ibid.). The non-separability of system and instrument implies that 
the properties of the system strictly depend on the kind of measurement we want to perform and cannot 
be described with the context provided by measurement apparatus. 
 In Kantian language, Bohr’s infelicitous term “influences”, which seems to suggest some sort of 
causal dependence, and to which he is referring to are the conditions of possibility of performing a 
quantum experiment (see Murdoch 1985), which, more faithfully to text, involve the principle of 
complementarity. 
 
3    Complementarity and dispositionalism in Bohr’s philosophy of quantum mechanics 
 
The main claim that we want to defend in this section is that a dispositional reading of Bohr’s 
philosophy of quantum theory is one clear way to formulate the problem of the existence of quantum 
                                                 
8 By referring to EPR, in his 1949 Bohr wrote “there is in a case like that just considered no question of a mechanical 
disturbance of the system under investigation during the last critical stage of the measuring procedure (Bohr 1949, 235). The 
“disturbance argument” was suggested by Heisenberg in 1930, in his optical, “microscope argument 
9 The hypothesis that Bohr abandoned the disturbance view according to which the quantum system has a previous 
definite value which is unknowable because its state is disturbed by the measurement had already been attacked by (Bohm 
1951, Folse 1985, Faye 1991, Whitaker 2004, 1324) but 235). The “disturbance argument” was suggested by Heisenberg in 
1930, in his optical, “microscope argument 
limits of knowledge as he saw them (for this claim see Dorato 2007). A disposition is a quadruple 
constituted by a quantum object Q possessing the disposition D, a stimulus S for the manifestation of the 
disposition and the manifestation event E. In symbols <O, D, S, E>. Typically, macroscopic dispositions 
like fragility are in principle reducible to the molecular structure of the glass. Analogously for 
flammability, or even for mental dispositions like irritability, etc. The main idea that we want to illustrate 
is that quantum systems S possess irreducible dispositions D whose manifestations depend on different, 
incompatible measurement contexts that are the stimula W of the manifestation event E,where E is simply 
the measurement outcome.  
Let me say at the outset that there is no explicit evidence in Bohr’s published and unpublished texts 
of his endorsement of a dispositional interpretation of quantum mechanics. And yet I think that such re-
interpretation does not distort Bohr’s thought too much, that it can clarify some of the most obscures 
points of his doctrine and is particular useful to illustrate one way of formulating the issue of the quantum 
limit of knowledge that is the aim of the current paper. 
In order to present this account and its correlated propensity-like approach to probability is 
opportune to recapitulate well known-doctrines expressed by Bohr already in the Como lecture (Bohr 
1928). First of all, Bohr claims that doing science presupposes a freedom of choice on the part of the 
experimenter. Therefore, the free decision to find out about the spatiotemporal aspect of the single 
dispositional nature of a quantum system O, implies the decision to have it interact with a classical, 
macroscopic apparatus (the stimulus S for the manifestation of the disposition possessed by O) that is 
appropriate to reveal it by making it manifest in the outcome (the event E). If, on the other hand, we want 
to reveal what he called the “causal” aspect (the conservation principles) of the single disposition 
possessed by the same system O, we must set the stimulus for its manifestation (the measurement 
apparatus) in the appropriated way. Since the two measurement settings are not only different but non-
realizable at the same time, the very same system’s spatiotemporal aspect of its disposition is lost.  
To apply these hypotheses to a concrete case study, think of his 1927 famous discussion with 
Einstein at the 5th Solvay conference. If we want to calculate the impact of an electron on the movable 
screen imagined by Einstein to be suspended on the top of the experiment table with a spring, we could 
in principle be able to measure the exchange of momentum between the electron and the screen in virtue 
of the conservation of momentum, which Bohr referred to as the “causal principle”.10But this in its turn 
                                                 
10 In virtue of the presence of a second two-slits screen posed behind the mobile one, according to Einstein one could 
at the same time determine in which of the two slits the particle went through. Position and momentum would be 
simultaneously determined. It is controversial whether Einstein’s thought experiment was really targeting Heisenberg. 
requires a very precise measurement of the velocity of the screen and therefore, in virtue of Heisenberg’s 
indeterminacy relations, an indeterminacy about the position of the pointer of the first screen. This 
indeterminacy that will cause a loss of the interference on the second screen, the typical behavior of 
waves. Note that in his objection to Einstein’s thought experiment, Bohr treats a macroscopic system as 
being subject to the quantum indeterminacy relations and equates it, with a “contextualist” move, 
(Zinkernagel 1916), with a quantum system!  
To the extent that such relations are an essential mark of the quantum description of reality, Bohr 
typically referred to classical systems that are not subject to the relations for as a necessary condition for 
the possibility of any quantum measurement. In his response to Einstein’s challenge, however, a 
macroscopic system is untypically regarded as quantum (i.e. not subject to Heisenberg’s relations) 
depending on the measurement context treated as non-separable from the impacting, “standard” or “real” 
quantum system (a particle). There is a (weak) sense in which his holism overcomes this difficulty: the 
complementarity principle tells us that if the first screen is solidly attached to the table, the position of 
the particle going through the slit (the spatiotemporal aspect of the single  disposition) is manifested and 
therefore becomes known, but then the exchanged moment cannot be calculated because the 
corresponding manifestation cannot occur.11 On the other hand, the presence of the mobile screen is an 
appropriate stimulus for the manifestation of the momentum of the incoming particle, but the 
complementary spatiotemporal aspect of the disposition is lost, because we cannot determine in which 
slit of the second screen the particle has gone through.  
As a matter of fact, additional evidence for the appropriateness of our dispositionalist interpretation 
of Bohr’s philosophy can be obtained by discussing the two-slits experiment, which, also according to 
Feynman contains all the mysteries of quantum mechanics. In Bohr’s language, the wave-like behavior 
of quantum systems depends on the fact that the stimulus of the disposition is such that both slits are 
open (so as to generate interference). The particle-like “aspect” of the system that is revealed after it 
enters both slits is such that only a small location on a spot of the second screen can be seen, because the 
second screen used to detect the arrival of the electron (the complementary stimulus for the manifestation 
of the disposition) is built to localize the wave in a certain point via a nonlocal phenomenon in which a 
spatially extended way collapses to a point of the screen. 
  
                                                 
11 For an attentive reconstruction of the important episode in the history of quantum mechanics, see Bacciagaluppi and 
Valentini (2009). 
The quantum limit of knowledge in the interpretation we are proposing can therefore be redescribed 
in terms of the impossibility of coming to know at the same time the two manifestations E of the single 
quantum dispositions within the same holistic measurement context (stimulus). Recall that according to 
Bohr, two properties are complementary if and only if they are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. 
We say that they are mutual exclusive because, by being necessitated to use one incompatible stimulus S 
at the time (measurement context), obtaining one outcome E (one of the two possible manifestations of 
the disposition) excludes the possibility to come to know at the same time the other possible manifestation 
of the single, intrinsic disposition possessed by the quantum system. As we know, complementary 
properties cannot be simultaneously revealed by the same experiment, given that any apparatus either 
selects spatiotemporal features of the quantum properties or keeps track of the exchange of momentum. 
On the other hand, if we refer to a quantum system before measurement, the complementary properties 
that can be manifested by the disposition of the quantum system must be regarded as jointly exhaustive: 
any attempt at attributing a not-yet measured system only one of the two possible manifestation or 
property would yield an incomplete description. In fact, we can attribute the unmeasured electron an 
intrinsic, single disposition that in itself is unknowable but that is capable to manifest incompatible 
outcomes according to incompatible measuring circumstances. 
 In a word, the whole experimental set-up provides the context of manifestation of quantum 
mechanical properties, that therefore must be conceived as being essentially dispositional. The 
probabilistic character of the quantum mechanical dispositions renders the language of single cases 
propensity particularly apt for giving an account of the origin of frequencies when many experiences are 
repeated. Furthermore, by giving us a chance to reinterpret the relationship between the principle of 
complementarity of non-commuting observables, the language of dispositions also helps us to make 
sense of what we find in experimental practice independently of the chosen interpretation of quantum 
mechanics: what a quantum entity is contextually depends not just on what other entities it has interacted 
with in the past (non-locality), but also on the whole experimental arrangement with which it interacts 




 4    Rovelli’s relationism and dispositionalism about quantum mechanics 
 
 
The theme of the relativization of physical quantities that were previously regarded as absolute 
goes through the history of physics as a leading thread. With the Galilean principle of relativity, for 
example, we discovered that the notion of velocity is relative to an arbitrarily chosen inertial frame. 
Analogously, within special relativity, “space by itself and time by itself, are doomed to fade away like 
mere shadows and only a kind of union between the two will preserve an independent reality” (Minkowki 
1908).12 However, this process of relativization was accompanied by the search for invariant elements, 
in this case, of relativity the four-dimensional metric. In Rovelli’s relational quantum mechanics, the 
relativization is even more radical as it extends to the identity of quantum-physical systems, at least to 
the extent that (i) the possession of some intrinsic properties is essential to the identity of an object13 and 
(ii) no entity can exist if it does not have an intrinsic identity. The identity of objects or physical systems 
S in the relational quantum world envisaged by Rovelli is therefore purely structural, in a ontic structural 
realism:14 post-measurement assertions like “relative to observer O, system S has value q” are true only 
relative to O. For another observer P, S could have no definite value until P interacts with O+S, and, as 
we are about to see, the outcome that P attributes to O+S and therefore to O’s observation may differ 
from q. In the special theory of relativity, on the contrary, the fact that “body B has length L relative to 
system S” holds for any possible observer and there is in any case the Minkowski metric that plays the 
role of an invariant element. In relational quantum mechanics, Rovelli seems to have no new absolute 
quantity to propose, except, perhaps the probability rules (the Born rules) associated to all measurement 
interactions. 
After the necessary qualification that the term “observer” in Rovelli’s approach refers to any 
quantum system whatsoever (not just to conscious beings), it is important to add that the so-called be-
ables (by Bell contrasted to observa-bles) of his interpretation are the outcomes of the interactions 
between two quantum systems, namely events, which are the building blocks of spacetime. Each of these 
                                                 
12 It is more controversial whether in general relativity all kind of motion is relative: Malament (2000) proved a theorem 
in which rotation has to be considered an intrinsic property. 
13 Philosophers also talk about irreducible elements that provide identity to objects (heacceitates) independently of 
their properties 
14 For an overview of the rich literature on ontic structural realism, see French 2014. 
events in succession is a local perspective on the rest of the universe, or a local, non-necessarily 
continuous worldline W whose temporal order cannot be extended to any other systems.15  
In my previous reconstruction of Rovelli’s relational approach (Dorato 2016), I suggested that it is 
preferable to defend a dispositionalist interpretation of the indeterminacy of any quantum system before 
a measurement interaction, so that both non-interacting quantum systems S and “observers” O have no 
intrinsic properties, except dispositional ones. In other words, such systems S have intrinsic dispositions 
to correlate with other systems/observers O, which manifest themselves as the possession of definite 
properties q relative to those Os. The real events of the world are the ‘realization’ (the ‘coming to reality’, 
the ‘actualization’) of the values q, q0, q1, . . . in the course of the interaction between physical systems.  
Exactly like Wigner, Rovelli reconstructs Von Neumann dualistic evolution by distinguishing 
between observers that are internal to the interaction S+O and those that are external to it (in the example 
above, the observer P). Wigner’s friend O inside the room is internal to the interaction with S and 
perceives a definite event as a result of the correlation, while Wigner, that is external to the interaction, 
consider the system S+O in a superposed state until he correlates with the joint system: “In one word: 
value assignment in a measurement is not inconsistent with unitary evolution of the apparatus+system 
ensemble, because value assignment refers to the properties of the system with respect to the apparatus, 
while the unitary evolution refers to properties with respect to an external system.” (Rovelli 1998, 19).  
We can now present three possible senses in which Rovelli’s relational quantum mechanics poses 
a in-principle limitation to the our knowledge of the physical world. The first sense is given by Rovelli’s 
identification between the interaction between any two systems and an exchange of information. It then 
follows a priori that no system can have information about itself: “The unitary evolution does not break 
down for mysterious physical quantum jumps, due to unknown effects, but simply because O is not giving 
a full dynamical description of the interaction. O cannot have a full description of the interaction of S 
with himself (O), because his information is correlation, and there is no meaning in being correlated with 
oneself. (Rovelli 1997, p. 205, emphasis in original).  
The second sense referred to above is even more important from the viewpoint of this paper since 
in Rovelli’s interpretation the limits of knowledge imposed by quantum theory extend not just to the 
dispositional properties of single, non-measured quantum systems but also to a temporal succession of 
measurement outcomes (events). In other words, the worldlines that are invariant for all observers and 
that typically constitute the relativistic four-dimensional world according to Rovelli would be described 
                                                 
15 Interestingly, in Rovelli’ interpretation this non-extendibility is forbidden not just for relativistic reasons. Stress on 
the discontinuous character of Rovelli’s ontology is defended in Laudisa and Rovelli (2019). 
differently by different observers: “in quantum mechanics different observers may give different 
accounts of the same sequence of events” (Rovelli 1996, p. 4). However, how can sequences of events 
retain their identity if the outcomes that different observers measure are events and events have identities 
that depend on the interaction with different observers? Doesn’t it follow that in relational quantum 
mechanics not even the sequence of events is objectively knowable since it is not invariant across 
different observers? 
The following example, discussed by Brown, will help to shed some light on this difficult case. 
With obvious notation, suppose that at time t1 the state of the quantum system S is in the superposition:  
     
SS
S   ,           with 
22
  =1                                       (1) 
Suppose that at time t2 O measures S and that, relative to her (or it), the outcome is 
S
  
According to the relational interpretation, the state of S for O evolves from 
SO




 at time t2. The index S/O expresses the fact that the outcome “spin up” revealed by the 
interaction between the system S and the observer O is relative to the latter. Given the linearity of the 
evolution of the Ψ function, according to another observer P who at time t2 has not yet interacted with 
S+O, the two systems S+O at time t2 are still superposed, so that relative to Pat time t2 we have 
|ψ > SO/ P = α|up>O |↑>S + β|down>O |↓>S.                                              (2) 
Let us quote Brown in full: “the probability that P will find the state at [a later time] t3 to be |up>O |↑>S 
…. is |α|2, and the probability of |down>O |↓>S  is ||2. So, as von Neumann taught us, the probabilities 
agree. But notice: if we are to take relational quantum mechanics seriously, nothing said so far prevents 
it from being the case that P finds |down>O |↓>S at t3, and thus S being spin-down for P, even though S 
was spin-up for O!” (Brown 2009, p. 690).  
Is this a contradiction? The sequence of events: ‘O ready to measure S (1) at t1, then ‘S finds spin 
up at t2’, then ‘P finds that S found spin down at t3’ is different from the sequence that began with O 
ready to measure and then led to the observation that according to S is spin down, because the correlation 
between S and O is described differently from O and P. It is this correlation that is the objective selfsame 
’ meta-event’ generating non-invariant measurement events when systems and observers interact. By 
distinguishing between processes of correlations P from processes of the outcomes of these correlation 
the temporal evolution remains objective at the metalevel and does not conflict with the constraints of 
relativity, despite the discontinuous character of the worldline interactions.  
The third of the senses mentioned above shows how Rovelli’ relationism shows important 
similarities with Everettian quantum mechanics whenever an observer is the target of an another 
observer. For simplicity suppose that I am O and you are P. For me S has spin up and I observed that S 
has spin un, for you, after reduction of (2), my interaction with S resulted in spin down and I observed 
spin down. However, this relativization won’t do: how can I observe that S has spin up (for me) and at 
the same time observe that it has spin down (relative to you?). Our observations cannot be relativized! 
Can I observe and not observe that the same system S has spin up and not spin up? In order to avoid the 
contradiction some sort of Everettian quantum mechanics is called for, in such a way that relative to a 
state of the system, I observe that S’s spin is up and you observe that I observe that spin is up while 
relative to the other state of the system I observe that the spin is down and you observe that I observe 
that spin is down. Coherence is then reestablished. 
The reader can establish by herself the cogency of this claim by reading the following long 
quotation: “There does not, in general, exist anything like a single state for one subsystem of a composite 
system. Subsystems do not possess states that are independent of the states of the remainder of the system, 
so that the subsystem states are generally correlated with one another. One can arbitrarily choose a state 
for one subsystem, and be led to the relative state for the remainder. Thus we are faced with a fundamental 
relativity of states, which is implied by the formalism of composite systems. It is meaningless to ask the 
absolute state of a subsystem—one can only ask the state relative to a given state of the remainder of the 
subsystem. (Everett 1956, 103; 1957, 180). 
 
 
5  Rovelli’s relational quantum mechanics and the universal state function 
 
In sum, in relational quantum mechanics there are no absolute states with definite properties. 
However, if such states ought to be interpreted as suggested above as being irreducibly dispositional, 
ontologically there must be a purely dispositional, quantum state of the universe, so that quantum 
cosmology is a legitimate enterprise. From an epistemological point of view, however, quantum 
cosmology requires that one studies large segments of the universe in relation to other segments. Recall 
that in relational quantum mechanics there is no fact of the matter about whether two different observers 
O and P get the same result out of an interaction with the system S, since this is a question about their 
absolute states.  
It follows that if S is the whole universe, then, qua isolated system, also S is an absolute system 
with potentially infinite, purely dispositional properties that, lacking any external stimulus, cannot be 
manifested. Nothing can interact with the quantum universe S in principle, for there is no external 
observer. Consequently, the quantum universe S can be only partially known by interacting with parts of 
it from within, namely by dividing it into two parts, one of which, the observer O, must be contained in 
S. If the quantum universe can be described only from within, we must somehow consider all the possible 
compatible perspectives about it, each of which depends on a cut of the universe into two parts, a system 
and an observer and the way the exchange information. The consequence of this is of momentous 
importance: Rovelli’s relational approach to quantum mechanics entails that the quantum state of the 
universe cannot be know! Another, more dramatic instance of the impossibility of self-measurement of 
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